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Abstract—We study the problem of achieving 
proportional fair resource allocation in a non-cooperative 
multiuser OFDM network. We propose an auction-based 
scheduling algorithm, which combines the merits of the 
VCG auction and the greedy MC PF algorithm, to ensure 
that wireless users truthfully declare their resource 
requirements even though the users are inherently selfish. 
Through simulations, we find that users lying about their 
resource requirements are severely penalized by very high 
payments so that they should rather declare true valuations 
of subcarriers to the scheduler. Thus, the proposed 
auction-based scheduling algorithm can be used efficiently 
in a non-cooperative situation to realize proportional 
fairness.  
 
Keywords: Auction; VCG mechanism; resource scheduling; 
OFDM; non-cooperative wireless networks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, wireless resource management is based 
on the premise that autonomous wireless users are 
cooperative so that the precious resource (e.g., 
bandwidth) can be allocated among users in a globally 
optimal manner. However, in many practical scenarios, 
wireless users are autonomous and thus, may exhibit 
non-cooperative behaviors due to self-interests [1]. For 
instance, in a public WLAN hot spot, individual users 
may attempt to deviate from the standard protocols or 
algorithms and behave in a rational but selfish manner so 
as to gain advantages in radio resource allocation, without 
regard to the overall system performance.  
Recently, the problem of non-cooperative resource 
management has become a hot-topic in the research 
community. For instance, in [1], we have studied the 
impact of selfish behaviors on efficiency performance for 
Maximum Rate scheduling algorithm in a 
non-cooperative TDMA system, and proposed a 
repeated-game theoretic approach to thwart selfish 
behaviors and enforce users to report channel conditions 
truthfully to the scheduler. In many practical situations, 
besides efficiency, user fairness is also an important factor 
to consider. It is well known that proportional fairness 
(PF) [2] has been introduced as an effective solution to 
achieve a good balance between system throughput and 
user fairness. On the other hand, some more advanced 
multi-carrier techniques, such as orthogonal 
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) [3], have also 
been utilized in current high-speed wireless networks. In 
this paper we intend to extend our previous work from 
single-carrier systems to multicarrier systems while 
achieving PF resource allocation. 
There are several difficult challenges to be tackled. 
Firstly, in this non-cooperative situation, wireless users 
may be selfish and report their own channel conditions 
dishonestly as so to maximize their own benefits. As we 
have shown in [1], such a selfish behavior can 
dramatically reduce the system throughput. Thus, one of 
the most important objectives is to design an efficient 
mechanism to enforce reporting true channel conditions. 
Secondly, in OFDM systems, multiple subcarriers need to 
be allocated to different users. This greatly increases the 
complexity of the scheduling process. Thirdly, the quality 
of every subcarrier may be different for different users. 
Indeed, wireless users in OFDM systems compete for 
multiple units of radio resource instead of single object in 
the single channel TDMA system. Thus, the resource 
allocation algorithm must be capable of resolving 
competition for multiple objects among selfish users. 
Finally, to be of practical use, the proposed method must 
be suitable for practical implementation with a low 
complexity. 
Auctions [4] have recently been introduced into 
several areas of wireless communications to handle the 
problem of resource competition among selfish users. Sun 
et al. [5] proposed a channel allocation algorithm based 
on the second-price auction mechanism to allow wireless 
users to fairly compete for a wireless fading channel, but 
it did not consider multicarrier situation. Huang et al. [6] 
studied auction methods for cooperative communication 
systems. But whether truthful-revealing is a dominant 
strategy was not discussed. Fu and Schaar [7] proposed a 
resource management algorithm based on 
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [4] to ensure 
that wireless users truthfully declare their resource 
requirements. Gandhi et al. [8] formulated spectrum 
auctions as multi-unit auctions, and designed a scalable 
framework to maximize auction revenue and spectrum 
utilization. However, in their models, they just assumed 
the qualities of different spectrum bands are identical. 
Obviously, this is not a practical assumption. 
In summary, all these works are about single unit 
auctions or multi-unit auctions with identical value. But in 
OFDM systems, the quality of every subcarrier may be 
different for different users. Thus, the resource allocation 
problem needs to be formulated as a multi-unit auction 
with non-identical value, which is usually referred to as 
combinatorial auction [11]. Pal et al. [9] have proposed a 
combinatorial reverse auction-based scheduling algorithm 
to maximize the number of satisfied users in wireless 
systems. But, the bidding language and computational 
process are highly complex. The closest work to ours is 
[10], where an auction algorithm is applied to the 
OFDMA subcarrier allocation problem. Though it can 
achieve efficient resource allocation, it cannot prevent 
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 selfish users from reporting their valuations for 
subcarriers dishonestly.  
In this paper, we consider the design of an 
auction-based resource allocation algorithm with a low 
complexity to realize PF in a non-cooperative multiuser 
OFDM system. In such a system, wireless users compete 
for subcarriers allocated to them. All users evaluate the 
valuations of different subcarriers according to their 
channel conditions and QoS requirements, and submit 
bids to the scheduler, which also acts as the auctioneer. 
The auctioneer uses a VCG-based auction method to 
calculate payment paid by different users so as to enforce 
selfish users to truthfully report their valuation of 
subcarriers, and utilizes the greedy MC PF scheduling 
method proposed in [12] to achieve low-complexity 
resource allocation with PF in a multiuser OFDM system. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we 
describe the system model in detail. In Section III, an 
auction method is explained and presented in detail. Then 
we present our simulation results in Section IV. Finally, 
we draw our conclusions in Section V. 
II. MODEL 
Here we consider an OFDM system with K users and 
M orthogonal frequency subcarriers. The total spectrum 
bandwidth is W. At the physical layer, we use an L-path 
Rayleigh fading channel model. By using adaptive 
modulation, at time slot t, the k-th user’s data rate (bps) on 
the m-th subcarrier , ( )
a
k mr t  can be usually decided by the 
current channel SNR and the required BER, i.e., 
, 2 ,
1.5( ) log (1 ( ))
ln(5 )
a
k m k m
ber
r t t f
P
γ⎢ ⎥−= + ⋅ ⋅ Δ⎢ ⎥
⋅⎣ ⎦
 
(1) 
where , ( )k m tγ is the SNR for the k-th user’s m-th 
subcarrier signal at time instant t, berP is the required BER 
for this transmission, fΔ be the frequency spacing 
between two adjacent subcarriers. Let , ( )k mx t be the 
channel assignment status taking value 1 and 0 when the 
m-th subcarrier is and is not occupied by the k-th user, 
then the k-th user’ instantaneous data rate is defined as: 
, ,
1
( ) ( ) ( )
M
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m
r t r t x t
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In a cooperative situation, the objective of the 
scheduler is to achieve proportional fairness in multiuser 
OFDM system. In [12], it has been formulated as a global 
optimization problem based on the PF definition for MC 
systems in [13]. Here we redefine it as follows: 
,
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where the average rate ( )kR t can be approximated by a 
moving average value with average window size ct  time 
slots, i.e., 
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c c
R t R t r t
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But in a non-cooperative environment, a selfish user 
may report a bogus channel rate , ( )k mr t other 
than , ( )
a
k mr t or lie about its valuation , ( )
a
k m tν of the radio 
channel. Without reliable inputs, the resource allocation 
result is then totally different from that in a cooperative 
environment. Consequently, the radio resource may be 
utilized inefficiently. 
III. AUCTION-BASED ALGORITHM 
A. Auction analysis 
Motivated by the above considerations, we set out to 
solve the problem of resource competition among selfish 
users by applying the concept of auction from economics. 
Specifically, an auction is a decentralized market 
mechanism for allocating resources [7], consisting of 
three key elements: (1) the good to be allocated; (2) an 
auctioneer, who determines the allocation of the good and 
the payment paid by bidders; and (3) a group of bidders, 
who want to obtain the good from the auctioneer. In the 
non-cooperative multiuser OFDM system considered in 
our study, all users compete among each other for the 
subcarriers and each user has a different valuation for 
every subcarrier. Now, to formulate this problem as an 
auction, the good to be allocated are the M subcarriers, the 
auctioneer is just the scheduler in the BS, and the bidders 
are the K users.  
In a non-cooperative environment, the bidder can 
untruthfully declare (exaggerate) its resource requirement 
, ( )k mr t or its valuation of subcarriers , ( )
a
k m tν in order to 
obtain a higher throughput. With inaccurate bidding 
information, the auctioneer cannot allocate resource 
among users efficiently and fairly. Thus, we need a 
mechanism to prevent the bidder from lying to the 
auctioneer about its valuation for the subcarriers. Indeed, 
the auction method should be incentive compatible, i.e., a 
rational bidder will always tell the truth as enticed by the 
auction rule.  
VCG auction [4] has been regarded as one of the most 
effective mechanism to induce truth-revealing strategies. 
Specifically, in a VCG auction, by charging each bidder a 
payment corresponding to the inconvenience it causes to 
other bidders, the auctioneer can encourage the bidder to 
report truthfully and thus, resource is allocated in an 
efficient manner. Thus, we design an auction-based 
algorithm using the VCG auction model so as to enforce 
bidders to tell their truthful valuations of the subcarriers. 
As described in Section I, another important 
requirement is to allocate subcarriers among competitive 
users so as to achieve PF through a multi-unit auction. 
Most of the existing solutions for multi-unit auctions 
apply combinatorial auctions as the most general 
framework [9], [11]. Unfortunately, these auctions 
usually require complex bid expression that grows 
exponentially with the size of goods, and depend highly 
on complex allocation and pricing process, which requires 
solving NP-hard optimization problems. However, in a 
practical scheduling scenario, we should avoid the 
complex combinatorial auctions while achieving PF.  
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 In our previous study [12], we have proposed a low 
complexity greedy MC PF method in multiuser OFDM 
systems. With this method, proportional fairness can be 
achieved by assigning subcarriers to the user with the 
highest system PF value one by one. Consequently, the 
greedy MC PF algorithm can be utilized to allocate 
subcarriers in real time. 
Specifically, in [12], the system PF value if user k 
occupies subcarrier m is defined as: 
''
,
'
( )( ) ( )
( , ) log(1 ) log(1 )
( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( )
( )
( , , ) log(1 )
( 1) ( )
a
jk k m
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j
c jj k
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t R t t R t
r t
PF t k m
t R t
≠
≠
+
= + + +
− − ⋅
= + +
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∑
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where ' ( )kr t is the user rate for user k before the 
assignment of the subcarrier m. Because the subcarrier is 
assigned to the user so that the highest system PF value 
can be achieved, a rationally selfish user k may just 
evaluate its valuation , ( )
a
k m tν of subcarriers based on the 
PF value and report a higher one , ( )k mv t so as to increase 
its opportunity to be scheduled. Then the resulting 
throughput could be heuristically increased.  
Specifically, at time slot t, when letting user k’s 
valuation for sending traffic on subcarrier m with data 
rate , ( )
a
k mr t be , ( )
a
k m tν , it can be expressed by user k’s PF 
value on subcarrier m, i.e., 
'
,
,
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a
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k m
c k
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v t PF t k m
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B. Auction design 
With the above analysis, we can propose an 
auction-based scheduling algorithm combining the VCG 
auction, which is employed to calculate payment and 
realize incentive compatibility, as well as the greedy MC 
PF algorithm, which is used to achieve low-complexity 
PF scheduling for a multi-user OFDM system. Our 
algorithm can be summarized as follows. 
? Channel condition measurement and valuation: 
At the beginning of time slot t, every user k 
measures , ( )
a
k mr t on each subcarrier m corresponding to its 
experienced SNR , ( )k m tγ , and calculates its valuation on 
each subcarrier , ( )
a
k mv t . 
? Bidding: 
Because there are M subcarriers, every user k submits a 
set of bid , ( )k mb t according to its valuation , ( )
a
k mv t on 
subcarrier m. Furthermore, it is also related to the reported 
data rate , ( )k mr t other than its true rate , ( )
a
k mr t . Thus, it can 
also be expressed as: 
'
,
, , ,
( ) ( )
( ) ( ( )) ( ) log(1 )
( 1) ( )
k k ma
k m b k m k m
c k
r t r t
b t f v t v t
t R t
+
= = = +
−
 (7) 
? Allocation and payment: 
After collecting all bids from these K users, for every 
subcarrier m, the auctioneer determines the allocation 
results *, ( )k mx t according to the greedy MC PF scheme, 
and calculates the payment , ( )k mp t to be paid by user k 
according to VCG auction, i.e., 
,
*
,
, ,
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( )
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(9) 
The first term of (9) is the maximum aggregated 
valuation that other users can derive if user k does not 
participate in the auction, and the second term is the sum 
of aggregated valuation of the other users except user k 
under optimal resource allocation results *, ( )k mx t in the 
presence of user k.  Thus the payment paid by each user 
corresponds to the loss of declared valuation it imposes to 
the others through its presence. 
It should be noticed that one subcarrier can only be 
occupied by just one user. Thus, the sealed-bid 
second-price auction [4], which is a special case of VCG 
auction, can be used to simplify the process of calculating 
allocation and payment results. Let * ( )mk t be the user 
chosen by the auctioneer to occupy subcarrier m, (8) and 
(9) can be replaced by the following expressions: 
*
,
( )
( ) arg max( ( ) log(1 ))
( 1) ( )
j
m k m
k c jj k
r t
k t b t
t R t≠
= + +
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b t k k t
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Notice that the auction-based algorithm is suitable when 
the users come and go in a dynamic situation, because the 
VCG mechanism can prevent users from cheating, and the 
auctioneer allocates the resource to the bidder with the 
highest bid. Thus, when a new user enters the network and 
submits bid, the auctioneer can still process this information 
according to the proposed algorithm. In terms of 
computational complexity of the algorithm, we can see that 
after collecting all bids from the K users, for every subcarrier 
m, the auctioneer determines the allocation results according 
to Eq. (10), and calculates the payment to be paid by user k 
according to Eq. (11). Thus, for a system with K users and M 
subcarriers, the computational complexity is KM.  
IV. SIMULATIONS 
In this section, we present our simulation results on the 
model used in [12]. The entire system bandwidth is 20 MHz, 
which is divided into 256 subcarriers. The wireless channel 
is also modelled as a six-path frequency-selective Rayleigh 
fading channel. Each path is simulated by Clark’s fading 
model and suffers from different Rayleigh fading with the 
maximum Doppler frequency of 30 Hz, which corresponds 
to the average speed of 4.5 km/h for the carrier frequency of 
5 GHz. The maximum BER requirement is 510− . 
We verify the intuition that the users will be penalized if 
they lie about their resource requirements by exaggerating 
their own valuations. In this simulation, we compare the 
throughput as well as the payments paid by users under two 
scenarios: (1) no user is lying about its valuation, and (2) 
only User 5 is lying about its valuation, but the others are 
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 telling the truth. Table I shows the efficiency and fairness 
performance, as well as the payments, for the two cases. 
From this table, we can see that when all users reveal the 
true valuations of the subcarriers, the resources are allocated 
among users efficiently and in a fair manner. However, 
when User 5 exaggerates its valuation, its throughput is 
improved by 94.39%, but the payment to be paid is also 
significantly increased by 1525.88%. Furthermore, the 
throughput of any other user is decreased dramatically. Thus, 
the fairness performance also deteriorates due to the selfish 
behaviour of User 5. Now, it becomes clear that, by using the 
VCG-based auction scheduling, the lying of selfish users is 
penalized through a significantly increased payment. Thus, a 
rational user will not lie about its valuation of subcarriers 
because the increased cost cannot be compensated by the 
improved throughput. Consequently, with the proposed 
auction-based scheduling scheme, selfish users will be 
enticed to report their channel conditions and corresponding 
valuation of channels honestly. Moreover, its bid is just its 
true valuation of the channels, i.e., , ,( ) ( )
a
k m k mb t v t= . Thus, 
PF can be achieved in non-cooperative multiuser OFDM 
system as that in a cooperative environment. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we extend our previous research about 
non-cooperative scheduling in TDMA system in two aspects. 
Firstly, we focus on the problem of how to allocate resource 
with PF, while in [1] the fairness performance is not 
considered. Secondly, we study this non-cooperative 
resource allocation in a multiuser OFDM environment 
instead of a single-carrier TDMA system considered in [1]. 
We propose an auction-based scheduling algorithm, which 
combines the merits of the VCG auction and the greedy MC 
PF algorithm, to ensure that wireless users truthfully declare 
their resource requirements and achieve a low-complexity 
PF scheduling in a non-cooperative multi-user OFDM 
system. Through simulations, we find that users lying about 
their resource requirements are severely penalized by very 
high payments so that they should rather declare true 
valuation of subcarriers to the scheduler. We also observe 
that a conventional PF scheduling scheme heavily depends 
on the truthfully reporting from wireless users, then it will 
result in significantly worse performance when users 
dishonestly report their requirements, because it does not 
provide a mechanism to penalize selfish users for misusing 
resources. In summary, the proposed auction-based 
scheduling can be used efficiently in non-cooperative 
situation to realize proportional fairness. 
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Table I: Comparisons of throughput, fairness and payments in the two cases. 
User 
(1) No users lying (2) Only User 5 lying ΔThroughput 
(%) 
ΔPayment 
(%) Throughput 
(Kbps) Payment 
Throughput 
(Kbps) Payment 
1 6.202 5.777 4.696 80.07     -24.28% 1386.01% 
2 6.536 6.050 4.835 82.02 -26.03% 1355.70% 
3 5.477 5.527 3.952 72.60 -27.84% 1313.33% 
4 5.879 4.870 4.781 65.80 -18.68% 1351.75% 
5 6.953 7.013 13.516 107.01 +94.39% 1525.88% 
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